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1. The evolution of an international manufacturing company may be regarded 
as passing through three stages? export, international production, and 
multinational enterprise. 
2. In entering the international production stage, manufacturers have 
generally started with licensing, but have then moved on to direct investment, 
avoiding contract supply arrangements for final products with local 
manufacturers. Ordinarily, the initial investment by a manufacturer in 
foreign production facilities marks a critical step in the evolutionNof an 
international enterprise because he commits substantial financial, managerial 
and technical resources that are exposed to many new risks. 
3. A shift in management philosophy towards a global conception of the 
enterprise marks the beginning of the multinational enterprise stage. Top 
management starts to plan, organize and control the total activities of the 
company on a global scale that transcends the traditional distinction 
between domestic and foreign business. 
4. Only a handful (perhaps a hundred or so) manufacturing companies in the 
United States and Europe have reached the multinational stage at the present 
time, but many more will do so in the decades ahead, including manufacturers 
in Japan. The great majority of international companies, however, will 
probably remain at the international production or exporting stages; there 
is no inevitable progression to the multinational stage. Despite their 
small numbers, the big multinational companies are likely to be the principal 
architects and builders of a world-wide pattern of international trade, 
production and investment in technologically intensive goods during the 1970s 
and subsequent decades of thi3 country. 
5«, The international company at the multinational stage wants to make 
decisions in production, finance, marketing, procurement, research and 
development, and personnel without regard to political boundaries. And so 
the stage is set for a oonflict between the nation-state and the multinational 
company. Relations between the multinational company and national governments 
in latin America, Africa and Asia will be exacerbated by the fact that for 




European and Japanese. The fundamental question may be posed as follows: 
How can the powerful economic energies of the multinational company be 
harnessed so as to benefit all the nations of the world and all the world's 
peoples? 
6. The manufacturing enterprise first invests abroad in order to penetrate 
and develop foreign markets; marketing strategy is the main propulsive force 
although it is constrained by financial and production factors. 
7. During the international production stage, a manufacturing enterprise 
is inclined to pursue a bilateral international marketing strategy; its 
management perceives foreign markets as separate national markets, ignoring 
interrelations among them. 
8. At the multinational enterprise stage, the manufacturer abandons 
bilateral marketing strategy for multilateral marketing strategy. National 
markets are viewed as global market segments; managerial attention is 
focused on building up intra-enterprise transactions among national affiliate 
companies on regional or global levels. Multilateral marketing strategy can 
be a potent generator of international trade; it has a direct bearing on the 
role of international manufacturing companies in the creation of exports 
from developing countries. 
9. To carry out a multilateral marketing strategy, the international 
company strives to integrate its policies and operations on a regional or 
world-wide scale. The basic form of integration is market integration 
which induces both international horizontal and vertical integration among 
manufacturing affiliates. The resulting intra-corporate transactions among 
enterprise affiliates will account for a rapidly growing share in world 
manufactures. 
10. To develop market, horizontal and vertical integration on a world-wide 
scale, the parent company must exercise managerial control over its national 
affiliate companies, The question of managerial control leads to the 
ownership issue. Top managers of highly-integrated international companies 
are almost always insistent on 100 per cent ownership of affiliates; full 
ownership is viewed as an absolute prerequisite for efficient global 
operations. In contrast, international companies that have little horizontal 




they may even actively search for joint venture partners. Probably the 
majority of international managers today consider ownership to be a 
pragmatic, business question rather than an ideological or political one. 
11. Although international managers are reluctant to decide on foreign 
ovmership arrangements for political reasons, they are very sensitive to 
political factors in reaching decisions on investments in specific foreign 
countries. The degree of political stability perceived by managers is 
probably the single most important determinant of a country's investment 
climate. What international managers fear most are sudden arbitrary changes 
in the "rules of the game". 
12. There is ample evidence that governments and international companies 
disagree on which government policies are most favourable to foreign 
investment. Both parties have a responsibility to learn much mbre about 
the motivations and interests of each other. 
13. Before an international manufacturing company actually invests in a 
country, it will have a broad choice of country locations, especially if its 
operations are world-wide in scope, Ifenufacturing is seldom resource-
oriented j it is rather market-oriented, but even here lower trade barriers 
in the industrial areas of the world may make it economic to supply national 
markets from external production bases. In this'regard, manufacturing companies 
differ sharply from extractive companies. 
14» The locational mobility of international manufacturers gives them a 
strong negotiating power with respect to individual governments seeking to 
attract foreign investment. 
15. Most foreign investment in manufacturing has occurred in North America 
and Western Europe, not in the developing areas of the world where markets 
are smaller and political risks are higher. The developing countries must 
find ways to encourage such investment or else foresake its potential 
economic contributions, 
16, Since the 1930?, international manufacturers have established plants 
in Latin America principally to maintain an export market that was threatened 
with extinction by import restrictions. Since local competition was weak", 
government import-substitution policies have tended to create monopolistic 




created local companies) that are primarily oriented to narrow local markets. 
From the standpoint of international management such investments are defensive. 
In contrast, international companies have pursued an aggressive strategy with 
respect to their investments in North America and Western Europe, responding 
to market opportunity and competition rather than to import restrictions. 
International affiliates in these two areas are now generating exports 
because their costs are competitive in world markets. 
17. Manufacturing costs are higher in Latin America than in North America 
or Western Europe even for affiliate® of the same international companiesf 
High production costs constitute the single greatest obstacle facing Latin 
American companies in their efforts to expand exports of manufactured products. 
The outlook for a meaningful reduction of manufacturing costs in the smaller 
Latin American countries is bleak because their narrow domestic markets 
inhibit both economies of scale and competitive forces-, in view of the slow 
pace of integration in Latin America, most of the future growth of manufactured 
exports will probably occur in Brazil, Mexico and Argentina. 
18» Regional integration would allow international companies to rationalize 
their operations in Latin America. One consequence of this rationalization 
would be a pronounced increase in intrar-regional trade in manufactured goods; 
another consequence would be a drastic reduction in the manufacturing costs; 
of international affiliates mainly because of economies of specialization and 
scale. By lowering costs, regional integration would prepare international 
affiliates for export to North America and Western Europe. 
19. Latin American governments should understand that any policies designed 
to limit the participation of international companies in regional common 
markets will also limit the creation by those companies of manufacturing bases 
for export to industrial markets outside the region. 
20. Generally, international affiliate companies will be more responsive"to 
efficient export promotion policies than national companies for at least 
three reasons: (1) external connexions with the parent company and its 
marketing organization, (2) concentration in newer and more technologically-
advanced products, and (3) more competent and aggressive management. 
21. Although international manufacturing affiliates as a group are probably 
more export-minded than national manufacturers, their exports remain only a 
/small fraction 
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small fraction of output. It is recommended that Latin American governments 
confer directly with international companies (first at the affiliate and then, 
if necessary, at the headquarters level) on the question of increasing 
affiliate exports. In the longer run, the host government will achieve 
greater export results through a screening of new investment proposals by 
international companies, 
22. Latin American governments should now decide on the importance of export 
effects relative to other effects for new foreign investment proposals. 
23. To make export effects the only criterion for the acceptability of 
foreign investment proposals would cause the rejection of most proposals. 
Latin American countries can hope to attract very few purely "export-base" 
projects that are entirely or primarily directed towards the export of 
advanced manufacturers to external markets. The principal motivation of 
international manufacturing companies to invest in Latin America will continue 
to be the penetration and development of markets in the region. To gain access 
to regional markets, some international companies should be willing to commit 
part of an affiliateTs production for export to extra-regional markets. 
24. The international company, especially at the multinational stage, has 
become ,a specialist in the transfer of products, technology, capital, and 
managerial enterprise among nations. In addition to its role as a transfer 
agent, the international company also functions as a change agent, creating 
new patterns of production, new technologies and new human skills in host 
economies and societies. !fhe feature that distinguishes enterprise transfer 
from official transfers is not capital or technology but management. 
25. Governments in Latin America cannot afford to ignore the international 
manufacturing company; rather they should learn to deal with itf It is 
necessary for them to find ways to exploit the resources of the international 
company while, at the same time, protecting the enduring interests of their 
own peoples in economic and social advancement. 
/This paper 
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This paper explores the actual and potential contributions of the 
international company to the development of industrial exports by the countries 
of Latin America. To evaluate this role it is helpful to understand the 
structure and strategy of the international company from both historical and 
managerial perspectives. How did certain enterprises, for the most part 
headquartered in North America and Europe, become progressively more 
international in their business activities? What are the critical factors 
in the investment decisions of such enterprises? In what ways can 
multinational companies contribute to industrial growth in the developing 
countries, and, in particular, to the growth of their industrial exports? 
What strategy should Latin American governments exploit in dealing with 
multinational companies? These are some of the questions examined in this 
paper. 
This paper is not a research reportJ it represents the thinking of 
this writer who has spent the past 15 years in university teaching and 
research on many aspects of the international company* For this reason, 
documentation is modest, and there is considerable reliance on the findings 
of the writer's own past research in the fiel<3t Some remarks are speculative 
in nature. 
I. THE EVOLUTION OF UtE INTERNATIONAL INDUSIRIAL ENTERPRISE 
tost private manufacturing enterprises prefer to remain wholly 
domestic, staying out of foreign operations. Entrepreneurs grow up in 
the national market where they gain confidence in their ability to judge 
market risks and m^et local competition. In contrast, international 
business appears complex, risHy and somewhat mysterious; it requires that 
managers learn to deal with foreign governments and peoples who may behave 
in bewildering ways. In brief, international business managers must know 
how to overcome political, economic, social an<i cultural barriers that 
/have few 
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have few counterparts at home. I s it any wonder, then, that most companies 
would prefer to remain safely at home? 
How, then, do some companies become international? The actual 
historical experience of international companies in the United States 
suggests that the process of internationalization is most likely to be 
a gradual evolution that may be described in three stages. 
The Export Stage 
This first stage begins with the initial inquiry about a company's 
products from a domestic export intermediary or directly from a foreign 
buyer. If the manufacturer responds positively to this inquiry, the result 
may be a foreign sale that he judges to be profitable. As a consequence, 
the. manufacturer follows UP subsequent inquiries and makes sales to other 
foreign buyers, probably via domestic intermediaries. At some point, the 
manufacturer decides that his export business should be actively developed 
rather than depend simply on unsolicited inquiries. To that end, he is 
likely to appoint an export manager and provide him with a small staff or, 
alternatively, turn over his export business to an export agent in his own 
country. 
If the manufacturer experiences a continuing expansion of export sales, 
the inadequacy of a "built-in" export department or his complete reliance 
on an outside agency will become increasingly evident. Consequently, the 
manufacturer next decides to establish a full export department at the same 
level as his domestic sales department. He also decides to circumvent the 
use of domestic intermediaries for his sales to some, if not all, foreign 
markets. Further growth of export sales may justify the establishment 
of foreign sales branches and even assembly operations if his products are 
disassembled to obtain a lower transportation cost to foreign markets. 
The manufacturer has now evolved towards a systematic export programme 
that is supported by market research, intensive advertising, and other forms 
of promotion. He may be selling full product lines in scores of markets 
and his export sales may be 10 per pent or more of this total sales. But 
he still depends entirely on export operations (aside from modest foreign 




first phase in the evolution of an international manufacturing company ends 
when, for reasons to be examined, the manufacturer decides to penetrate 
foreign markets via foreign production under one or more arrangements. 
Ihe International Production Stage 
Just as domestic manufacturers prefer to remain domestic, so do 
exporting manufacturers prefer to stay out of foreign production« Exports, 
however, are not always sufficient to achieve the manufacturer's international 
marketing objectives. He may seek foreign markets that cannot bs penetrated 
from a production base that lies outside those markets, either absolutely 
or at an acceptable level of sales. The most common explanation of this 
situation is, of course, high import tariffs and other barriers imposed by 
governments, but it may also be tftat- local competition'within a foreign 
market becomes so intense that an outside manufacturer's products are 
effectively excluded. How, then, can the exporting manufacturer hope to 
penetrate such a market? Quite clearly, he must find a way to supply the 
foreign market from a production base located inside that market. 
la principle, the exporting manufacturer may enter into foreign-base 
production in three basic ways? (1) licensing, (2) long-term contract 
arrangements with local producers, and (3) direct investment in manufacturing 
facilities. Which approach he chooses will depend on many factors, but 
generally U.S. manufacturers have started with licensing and have then 
increasingly shifted to direct investment, avoiding contract supply 
arrangements with,local manufacturers. 
Licensing is likely to be the first experience in foreign production 
for the exporting manufacturer because it appears so easyi it requires no 
capital investment and presenta no substantial risks. The manufacturer 
simply licenses the use of his patents, know-how and/or trademarks to an 
independent foreign producer in return for royalty payments that are usually 
expressed as a percentage of production or sales. In this way, the 
manufacturer expects to participate in the growth of a foreign market that 
he cannot penetrate effectively via exports. A pure licensing arrangement 
means that the manufacturer has substituted an export of technology for 
the export of his products. 
/The attractiveness 
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The attractiveness of licensing as a mode of entry into a foreign 
market is likely to diminish for the manufacturer as a result of his actual 
licensing experience. Commonly a licensee does not perform up to, the 
expectations of the licensing manufacturer in sales and market development. 
As a result, the licensor becomes frustrated because he has no managerial 
control over the licensee's operations. Hence direct investment in foreign 
production may become progressively more attractive to the manufacturer as 
compared to licensing. 
Ordinarily, the initial investment by the manufacturer in foreign 
production facilities marks a critical step in the evolution of an 
international business company, (However, this is not always the case. In 
particular,. United States companies are incline^ to view their plants in 
Canada as "domestic" rather than "foreign". For such companies their first 
investment outside Canada becomes the critical st^ep,) For the first time 
the manufacturer commits substantial financial, managerial and technical 
resources to an international venture. He is now exposed to risks (such 
as expropriation) that run for beyond the risks associated with exporting 
or licensing, and he has many more assets exposed to those ri3ks. Foreign 
direct investment, therefore, involves the top management of a company in 
international business" decisions ana operations to a far greater extent 
than exporting or licensing, 
The first investment abroad prepares the ground for subsequent 
investment, Plants may be established in several countries to produce one 
or more of the manufacturer's product lines. At the same time, the 
manufacturer continues to export the output of h'is domestic plants to many 
markets, either directly as via his foreign manufacturing subsidiaries. He 
also continues to engage in licensing, but increasingly he enters licensing 
arrangements with his own subsidiaries rather than with independent foreign 
producers, (Today the bulk of the royalties received by American companies 
from Europe is paid by the European subsidiaries of these same companies.) 
Towards the end of the international production stage in the evolution 
of an international company, the manufacturer will be penetrating markets 




by direct exporting from the parent company as well as by licensing 
arrangements. At the level of parent company, the management of these 
diverse operations becomes progressively more arduousj painful episodes 
signal the necessity to integrate the company's far-flung operations within 
a comprehensive global enterprise system in order to take full advantage 
of company resources. The shift in management philosophy towards a global 
conception of the enterprise marks the beginning of the third stage of 
evolution - the multinational enterprise. 
The Multinational Enterprise Stage 
A company becomes a multinational enterprise when its top management 
begins to plan, organize and control its total activities on a global scale 
that transcends the usual distinction between domestic and foreign biisiness. 
Such a company seeks answers to questions like theses Where in the world 
are our best markets?.Where in the world should we produce our products 
for these markets? Where in the world should we undertake research and 
development activities to create new products for future markets? Where in 
the world should we recruit people to staff our organization? Where in the 
world should we obtain financing for our capital investments and our 
operations? 
The transformation of an international production company into a 
multinational company does not happen quickly. It involves a substantial 
(and sometimes, drastic) reorganization of the comparer and the replacement 
of top managers who cannot develop a global outlook. Although more than 
one form of organization is available to the multinational company, one 
form in particular clearly reveals the significance of the global orientation 
to international business. It is depicted in Figure I. 
Members of the Board of Directors, the President, and the corporate 
staff executives all have global responsibilities* For example, the 
Vice-Prrsident I&rketing has the responsibility to provide advice, technical 
assistance and other staff support for all marketing operations of the 
enterprise throughout the world. Other corporate staff vice-presidents 
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Line responsibility at the operating level is organized by geographical 
regions. The Vice-President of South America, for instance, holds the 
responsibility (and commensurate line authority) for all the company's 
activities (production, finance, marketing, etc.) in South America. In 
particular, he has direct authority over the company's subsidiaries located 
in South American countries. Other line Vice-Presidents have a similar 
responsibility and authority for other regions of the world. It is 
noteworthy that no distinction between foreign and domestic operations 
appears in this organizational forms for a United States multinational 
company North America becomes just one of many world regions. 
Some Observations on the Evolutionary Scheme 
Only a handful of manufacturing companies in the United States and 
Europe have reached the multinational stage at the present time. All 
signs indicate, however, that far more manufacturers in the United States 
and Europe, as well as in Japan, will join the ranks of multinational 
companies, in the decades ahead. Nevertheless, the majority of international 
companies will probably remain at the international production or exporting 
stages. Most manufacturers in every country, of course, will remain 
wholly domestic in their orientation. There is, therefore, no inevitable 
progression to the multinational stage. Limitations of size and perhaps, 
more importantly, management philosophy will prevent many companies from 
becoming multinational, even among manufacturers who are presently 
exporting in substantial volume. 
It would be a mistake, however, to judge the importance of multinational 
companies solely in terms of their relatively small number (probably not 
more than 100 at most). Most of these companies are extremely big, dominating 
not only their home markets but markets throughout the wor Id. IBM, for 
example, has 70 per cent of the world market for computer equipment. Furthermore, 
they are concentrated in research-intensive, dynamic industries (electronics, 
nuclear energy equipment, transportation equipment, chemical specialties, 
petrochemicals, etc.) that will set the pace for economic growth and 
world trade in the years ahead. 
/In brief 
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In brief, multinational companies are likely to be the principal 
architects and builders of a world-wide pattern of international trade, 
production, and investment in technologically-intensive manufactured goods 
during the 1970s and subsequent decades of this century. 
A Note on the Multinational Company and the Nation-State System 
The world is politically organized into nation-states, each possessing 
a national sovereignty that claims exclusive juridical control over the 
national territory and all activities (indluding, of course, economic and 
business activities) that cross national boundaries or take place within 
them. In particular, national governments resent outside control over 
their economies that, in their judgement, infringes on their effective 
sovereignty. This concern for national authority is commonly intensified 
by nationalistic attitudes that carry an emotional tone. In short, national 
governments want economic independence as well as political independence. 
The latter is, of course, a question of degree because few countries 
could afford the costs of complete economic independence, that is to 
say, economic self-sufficient;1;. 
In contrast, the international, company at the multinational stage 
seeks to function as if the world were a s ing le g lobal market. It wants 
to make decisions in production, finance marketing, procurement, research 
and development, and personnel without regard to political boundaries. 
Remarkable advances in communication and transportation technology form 
the physical basis for such a global strategy while the advantages of 
economic specialization and international factor mobility form its . • 
economic basis. 
And so the stage is set for a conflict between the nation-state 
and the multinational company. Although this conflict will have 
manifestations that will vary from country to country and from company to 
to company it is important to understand that the conlfict is endemic 
and certainly not restricted to the developing countries (the "American 
Challenge" in Europe is a case in point). However, there is at least 
one important distinction between the developing countries and the 




future multinational companies will be mainly North American, European 
and Japanese. This fact alone will exacerbate relations between the 
multinational company and national governments in Latin America, Africa and 
Asia while, at the same, it will tend to moderate (but not eliminate) them 
in the developed w o r l d M 
Some international business scholars believe that the multinational 
company is pointing the way towards an eventual supra-national organization 
of the world's peoples. They assert that the nation-state is archaic 
because it cannot cope on its own with twentieth-centry technology; nor 
can it protect its people from a variety of threats ranging from pollution 
to nuclear warfare« Other scholars, while not going so far assert the 
necessity for institutional innovations if the nation-state and the 
multinational company are to reconcile their differences. Among these 
innovations may be cited the establishment of a United Nation corporate 
charter for international companies (possibly involving United Nations 
taxation) and the creation of a supra-national organization to prevent 
monopolistic abuses by global business enterprises. Suffice it to say 
at this point that the individual national government (including the 
United States Government) have only limited powers to deal with the big 
multinational company. The fundamental question may be posed as follows: 
How can the powerful economic energies of the international company, be 
harnessed so as to benefit all the nations of the world and all the world's 
people? A creative response to this question can only come through 
co-operation among national governments and international agencies at the 
highest levels. 
2/ As more European and Japanese companies become multinational (penetrating 
North American as well as other markets), one would expect some 
lessening of the resentment and concern now felt towards United States 
multinational companies in those areas. 
/II. WHY 
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I I . WHY MANUFACTURING ENTERPR ISES INVEST ABROAD 
As the foregping description of the evolution of an international 
company reveals, the manufacturing enterprise first invests abroad in 
order to penetrate and develop foreign markets, that, for one reason or 
another, cannot be effectively served from domestic export bases. This 
dominance of marketing strategy in the foreign investment decisions of 
manufacturers is fully brought out in a study by the National industrial 
Conference Board entitled United States Production Abroad and the Balance 
of Payments, Of course, a proposed foreign investment must satisfy a company's 
financial criteria, such as return on investment and cash flow, before it 
is approved by management. But the main propulsive force behind an 
investment in foreign manufacturing facilities is a desire to establish 
or strengthen the company's position in foreign markets. Financial and 
production factors seldom act as initiating forces; they function more as 
constraints than motivations» 
Bilateral and Multilateral Marketing Strategies 
During the international production stage, a manufacturing enterprise 
is inclined to pursue a bilateral international marketing strategy, that is 
to say, its management perceives foreign markets as separate national 
markets and ignores potential inter-relations among those markets and 
among its subsidiaries located in them. Putting the matter somewhat 
differently, the international production company invests in country X 
in order to supply a market in country X - not to supply markets in countries 
Y and Z or in the home country. Such a bilateral strategy is encouraged 
by government import restrictions that isolate a national market from 
other national markets. Until the end of the 1950s it was the dominant 
strategy of even big international manufacturers. 
At the multinational stage, however, the manufacturer abandons this 
bilateral strategy for a multilateral strategy. As observed earlier, 
managers now perceive a world-wide market that even includes the domestic 
market. National markets are viewed as global market segments. As a 
consequence, managerial attention becomes focused on building up intra-
enterprise transactions (flows of products, technology, capital, 
/and management) 
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and management) among national affiliate companies on regional or global levels 
in order to capitalize on economies of scale in all functions of the enterprise 
(R and D, production, marketing, finance, and management) and on the 
advantages of international specialization. 
It follows that a multilateral marketing strategy can be a potent 
generator of international trade, Manufacturing facilities are established 
in country X not only (or even mainly) to supply that market but to 
penetrate other national markets via exports. Or facilities are established 
in country X to supply inputs for plants of the international company 
located in third countries. Multilateral marketing strategy, therefore, 
has a direct bearing on the role of the international manufacturing 
enterprise in the development of exports from developing countries. Such 
a company strategy is encouraged by regional integration (such as the EEC) 
and by a general liberalization of international trade barriers through GATT. 
The emergence of this strategy in an era of generally low import 
barriers for manufactured goods in the industrial world, intensified by 
European integration, is hardly fortuitous. 
Forms of integration by the Multinational Company 
To carry out a multilateral marketing strategy, the international 
company strives to integrate its policies and operations on a regional or 
world-wide scale. The basic form of integration is market integration for 
the company's product lines and marketing programmes. Managers search 
for similarities among market variables in different countries, trying to 
answer questions such as the following: In which markets can we sell the 
same products and product lines? In which markets can we use the same 
channel, price and promotional policies and programmes? 
This multimarket approach offers enormous advantages to a comparer. 
On the cost side, international standardization of products makes possible 
economies of scale in research and development, production, and logistics. 
International standardization of marketing policies and programmes also 
offers economies of scale of many kinds. For example, the costs of designing 
an advertising programme, such as ESSO's. "Tiger in your Tank", may now 
be spread over a hundred national markets. On the demand side, market 
standardization promotes the creation of positive international images 
/that stimulate 
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that stimulate awareness of, and preferences for, the company's products. 
In this way, the company takes advantage of communication links among 
consumers and Industrial buyers in different countries, 
international market integration induces both international horizontal 
and vertical integration among the manufacturing facilities associated 
with the international enterprise. 
Horizontal integration occurs at the final product stage. Rather than 
have each of its national plants produce full product lines, the international 
enterprise creates a pattern of specialization among them, taking into account 
the scale of operations and the mix of factor services available in each of 
its country locations, including logistical factors of storage, handling and 
transportation. Ihe movement of finished products among its national 
production bases allows the international company to offer full product 
lines in each national market at lower costs and/or higher quality levels 
than would be possible if those lines were entirely produced by each 
production base. Only some of the products entering the product line of 
the international company in country X are now produced there? the remaining 
products come from manufacturing plants located in other countries, 
including the home country. Indeed, country X, itself may be the home 
country of the enterprise, (For many years, for instance, United States 
automobile companies have been importing automobiles from their production 
plants in Western Europe to broaden product lines in Worth America,) 
Vertical integration is a second form of co-operation among the 
manufacturing affiliates of the international company. Domestic vertical 
integration occurs when a manufacturing company decides to produce at least 
some of the.inputs required in the manufacture of its final products, At 
the extreme, vertical integration can extend backwards to raw material 
extraction, but for most manufacturers outside heavy industries (such as 
basic steel and other metals, heavy.chemicals, and oil refining) it is 
likely to go no further than the production of components and parts that 
are assembled into final products. 
/Vertical integration 
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Vertical integration becomes international in scope when a company 
manufactures components and parts in one or more countries for use by its 
plant or plants located elsewhere. Thus one international company 
manufactures refrigerators in Europe by producing the mechanical elements 
in its German plant and the structural components in its Franch plant 
while final assembly occurs in its Italian plant. Another recent example 
is the decision of Ford to obtain the engine for its next small American 
car from Opel, its German subsidiary. Of greater interest to Latin America 
is the IBM plant in Argentina that supplies specialized computer equipment 
to other IBM plants; in Latin America. 
Market integration, horizontal integration and vertical integration 
are all aspects of an international enterprise system that seeks to take full 
advantage of the economies of specialization and scale« The result is a 
linkage of the different national entities belonging to the enterprise (the 
parent company and its affiliates) through network flows of products, 
technology, capital and management. These flows, of course, enter the 
balance of payments of individual nations. (It is estimated that one-quarter 
of United States exports now represent intra-corporate transactions between 
United States parent companies and this foreign affiliates.) It is to be 
expected that such intra-corporate transactions will account for a rapidly 
growing share of world trade in manufactures. 
The Need for Managerial Control at the Headquarters Level 
To pursue market, horizontal and vertical integration on a world-wide 
scale, the parent company must exercise managerial control over its national 
affiliate companies. At the policy level, it must decide which manufacturing 
affiliates: will supply which markets and which strategies and policies will 
guide affiliate marketing programmes, (market integration); which affiliates 
will produce which final products (horizontal integration); and which 
affiliates will be used as sources of specific components and other inputs 
for affiliates producing final products (vertical integration). Moreover, 
the parent company must have a control system that signals variances between 
the actual performance and expected performance of its affiliates and it 
must have the means to correct such variances. As transactions among 
/affiliates (and 
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affiliates (and between them and the parent company) become more numerous 
and complex, the need for headquarters control becomes ever more pressing. 
Failure on the part of one affiliate to deliver inputs on time, in sufficient 
quantity, or in conformity with tight product specifications may cause 
disruptions that spread throughout the entire international enterprise 
system. 
This requirement for managerial control at headquarters should not 
be interpreted to mean that headquarters tries to manage everything at 
the affiliate level. To the contrary. Headquarters management ordinarily 
grants considerable operating autonomy to affiliate managers, frequently 
establishing the affiliates as profit centres. Furthermore, parent companies 
may invite the participation of affiliate managers in the formulation of 
enterprise strategies and policies. What centralized control does mean is 
that headquarters is responsible for global enterprise strategy and policies, 
the co-ordination of operations among all units, of the enterprise, and the 
monitoring of affiliate operations to insure they conform to plans. 
Headquarters also shapes the future structure of the enterprise 
through its investment decisions. It decides the kinds of new products 
the company should produce, the production capacity necessary for enterprise 
growth, and the location of new manufacturing plants to provide that 
capacity. The criteria that guide headquarters management in its 
determination of country locations for new manufacturing facilities is the 
subject of a later, section in this report. 
The Issue of Ownership 
The ownership of foreign affiliates; by international companies has 
provoked much unfavourable response in Latin America, especially in 
extractive industries- but in manufacturing industries as well. Many 
governments in Latin America now compel or strongly urge international 
companies to form joint ventures with local business partners. The 
motivations behind such policies are a mix of economic and political 
considerations of which two are most prominent: (l) the belief that 
joint ventures will stimulate the growth of local business enterprise 
(and consequently the econony as a whole) more effectively than local 
affiliates fully owned by international companies, and (2) the rejection 
/of foreign 
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of foreign ownership per se as a threat to national sovereignty. It is 
fitting, therefore to consider briefly the ownership issue from the 
standpoint of international enterprise management. 
The top managers of international enterprises that have achieved, or 
are striving to achieve, high levels of horizontal and vertical integration 
among foreign affiliates are almost always strongly insistent on 100 per cent 
ownership. These managers identify ownership with control, and since they 
must exercise control over .their affiliates in order to build a global 
enterprise system, full ownership appears to be an absolute prerequisite 
for efficient operations.^ 
General Motors, Ford and IBM illustrate this managerial position; 
all have integrated production, logistical and marketing operations at 
the international level. These companies push for full ownership of 
their affiliates and are. likely to stay out of countries where this is 
not possible. (General Motors has refused to invest in India because of 
the ownership issue.) IBM entered Japan only after the host government 
granted permission for 100 per cent-owned subsidiary, a remarkable 
concession in light of the strong Japanese policy on joint ventures. 
Furthermore, integrated enterprises try to gain full ownership of 
affiliates in which, for historical reasons, they have only a partial 
ownership. In I960, for example, Ford bought out the rest of Ford U.K. 
for $ 350 million despite a protest by the U.S. Government which was worried 
about the balance of payments effects of such a large capital outflow 
coming at the end of the year. In the 1950s General Motors acquired the 
remainder of Holden, its Australian subsidiary, from local interests. 
Another example is Westinghouse. For many years this company carried on 
international manufacturing via licensing arrangements with independent 
foreign producers. But now Westinghouse, in trying to create an international 
enterprise system, is abandoning licensing in favour of full ownership of 
foreign manufacturing facilities. 
2/ We are speaking here only of parent company ownership of foreign 
affiliates; the ownership of the parent company itself is another 
matter. 
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As noted earlier, economic and technological forces will encourage 
more international companies to reach towards higher levels of integration 
in the future. These companies will not easily-abandon their determination 
to have full ownership of foreign affiliates even in the face of resistance 
by host governments. 
In contrast, international companies that have little horizontal 
or vertical integration are usually less concerned about 100 per cent 
ownership and they may even actively search for joint venture partners. 
Scott Paper, a large manufacturer of paper tissue products, actually 
prefers to conduct its international business in developing countries 
through joint ventures in which it holds only a minority interest. Each 
of these joint ventures functions independently of the others, producing 
and marketing its products in the local market. In brief, a management 
following a bilateral marketing strategy is inclined to be more open on 
the question of local participation in its foreign affiliates because 
headquarters control is less vital. 
Other considerations also influence managerical attitudes towards 
ownership of affiliates. Aside from the issue of control, the parent 
company may want to invest its abundant capital to the fullest extent in 
its own business, why earn only a fraction of an affiliate's profits 
when the parent company has capital to own the entire affiliate? Associated 
with this attitude may be the conviction by management that local partners 
can contribute very little to the affiliate in terms of technology, 
production, marketing or general management. Some companies may also be 
unwilling to share their "technological secrets" with local partners. 
Finally, there are those managers who want to have full ownership of 
affiliates because this is the way the company has always operated at 
home and abroad. 
In view of the many factors that may shape attitudes towards 
ownership, it is not surprising that international companies do not agree 
i 
on the question of joint ventures. Jh a study of over 100 big United States 
international companies, the writer found that some 45 per cent favoured 
joint ventures while 55 per cent opposed them.^ Those companies that 
^ Franklin R. Root, "United States Business Abroad and the Political Risks", 
Business Topics, Winter 1968. 
/favoured joint 
ST/ECLA/Conf e 37/ L. 5 
Page 17 
favoured joint ventures said they did so because of the contributions in 
capital, management, marketing knowledge, etc., that local partners are 
able to offer. On the other hand, these companies rejected the notion 
that joint ventures were desirable because they pleased host governments 
or mollified nationalistic forces. 
This study also found that probably a majority of international 
managers view the question of ownership as a pragmatic, business question 
rather than one of ideology. To be sure, there are some managers who 
consider the ownership of foreign affiliates to be a right of international 
companies in the same way it is a right at home, but these managers would 
appear to represent only a small, declining majority. Most international 
managers today fully recognize that their companies have no a priori 
right to own foreign affiliates, that ownership rights are granted by host 
governments and may be withdrawn at the discretion of those governments. 
For many international companies, then, the question of ownership 
resolves itself into a variety of costs and benefits that are related to 
the performance, growth and profitability of the affiliate in question. 
In some instances, management nay conclude that the net economic benefits 
of a joint venture or licensing arrangement exceed the net economic 
benefits of a fully-owned affiliate. In other instances, the same 
management may conclude the opposite. 
One final important point emerges from this study: international 
managers are unwilling to take into account the political benefits and 
costs of different ownership arrangements. More to the point, they will 
almost always consider business arguments for joint ventures but seldom 




Managerial Criteria for the Country Location of 
Manufacturing Facilities 
Although international managers are reluctant to decide a foreign 
ownership arrangement for political reasons, they are very sensitive to 
political factors in reaching decisions on investments in specific 
foreign countries. Indeed, their perception of political risks in a particular 
country powerfully shapes their perceptions of investment opportunity and 
profitability in the same country. 
This last statement is supported by a study undertaken by this writer 
of managerial attitudes towards governments and investment opportunities 
in five countries - the United Kingdom, France, Mexico, Brazil and India.^ 
International executives in over 100 big United States companies were 
asked to respond to semantic differential tests that measured their attitudes, 
towards the governments and investment opportunities in those five countries. 
It was found that attitudes towards governments were highly correlated 
with attitudes towards investment opportunities. For example, if 
executives believed a government were unstable, they were also 
inclined to believe that investment opportunities in that country were 
unprofitable and risky. Indeed, the degree of political stability perceived 
by managers emerged as the single most important determinant of a country's 
investment climate. It is the main reason why Mexico was viewed by these 
international executives as having an excellent investment climate in sharp 
contrast to Brazil's. 
Political stability is a key concern of international managers 
because in its absence planning business operations becomes a very chancy 
affair, menaced by political uncertainties. On the other hand, international 
companies are generally- willing to make accomodations to strong government 
policies towards foreign investment if these companies believe there 
exists a fundamental political stability. What international companies . 
fear most are sudden, arbitrary changes in the "rules of the game", When 
y Franklin R. Root, "Attitudes of American Executives Towards Foreign 
Governments and Investment Opportunities", Economic and Business -
Bulletin, January 1963. 
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they believe the rules of the game will be maintained by a strong government, 
then they are often willing to play the game despite demanding miles. The 
case of Mexico clearly documents this observation. 
For many manufacturing companies, political stability appears to be 
a necessary condition for investment in a particular country. But it is 
not a sufficient condition. A management must also perceive a real 
investment opportunity that will be profitable, to the company. The many 
economic factors that must be investigated to evaluate a proposed foreign 
investment have been widely discussed in the literature and there is no 
need to go into them here. Suffice it to say that the economic criteria 
used to evaluate a proposed investment in manufacturing facilities intended 
for the local market are likely to differ from the criteria, used to evaluate 
manufacturing facilities intended for international markets (including 
intra-corporate transfers). 
l%ny governments seek to attract private foreign investment with a 
variety of concessions (taxation, accelerated depreciation allowances, etc.) 
as well as the active promotion of investment opportunities through the 
press and other media in the advanced countries. However, there is 
abundant evidence that governments and international companies disagree 
on which government policies are most favourable to foreign investment. 
A study by Robinson found that foreign investors consider the five most 
favourable policies to be: (l) establishment and firm adherence to a 
national development programme, (2) favourable terms for the transfer 
of profits and capital repatriation, (3) non-discrimination versus foreign 
ownership and control, (A) equality of treatment with domestic enterprises, 
and (5) freedom from detailed or burdensome regulations on organization, 
ownership and management.^ 
In contrast, his research on twenty governments showed that governments 
consider the five most important investment incentives to be: (l) tax 
relief to new enterprises, (2) equality of treatment with domestic enterprises, 
(3) a progressive domestio climate, (4) the transfer of profits and capital 
repatriation, and (5) government-sponsored credit institutions. 
Harry J. Robinson, The Motivation and Flow of Private Foreign 
Investment (Menlo Park, California: Stanford Research Center, 1961). 
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When governments do not know which factors are important to foreign 
investors, official investment promotion policies will be less than 
successful. Furthermore, government negotiations with foreign enterprises 
will be hindered by a misunderstanding of managerial motivations and interests. 
Of course, international managers have an equal obligation to understand 
the motivations and interests of host governments. Too often the foreign 
investors look at his projects only in business terms, paying no attention 
to its implications for economic growth, the balance of payments, employment, 
and other consequences that are of primary concern to host governments. If 
communication between the two parties is to be effective, then, both have 
a responsibility to learn much more about each other. Only in this way can 
they hope to avoid disputes arising out of simple misunderstanding, and 
thereby focus all their efforts on the resolution of real disagreements. 
More positively, mutual understanding should help each party to adapt his 
respective position to the interests of the other without, at the same 
time, sacrificing his own true interests. 
Before an international manufacturing company actually invests in a 
country, it will have a wide range of location options, especially if its 
operations are world-wide in scope. Manufacturers can be very flexible 
in the choice of country locations because manufacturing processes are not 
tied to natural resource locations.^ Furthermore, advances in transportation 
technology are continually broadening location options for manufacturers. 
Japan demonstrates this fact in a remarkable fashion. That country has 
built a massive steel industry with no local sources of iron ore and ore 
and only meager local supplies of coking coal, and most of the raw material 
inputs for its other industries are also procured from foreign sources. 
Rather than being resource-oriented, manufacturing installations 
tend to be market-oriented. The powerful pull of markets in North America, 
Western Europe and Japan on foreign investors is a fact of international 
business. But the lowering of trade barriers, the emergence of common 
6/ International extractive companies have fewer location options; they 
are limited to a certain number of countries that have the proper 
natural resources. Even here, however, no single country is likely 
to have a monopoly resource position. 
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markets and free trade areas, as well as transportation and communication 
improvements make it progressively more economic for manufacturers to supply 
national markets from external production bases. For example, although the 
tfriited States manufacturer may.be strongly compelled by reason of market 
opportunity (and competition) to invest in the European Common'Market, 
he may choose among six countries for the location of his manufacturing 
facilities. 
In brief, today's international manufacturing company enjoys a high 
degree of freedom in the selection of foreign locations for his production 
bases. Natural resource or market locations will seldom limit his freedom 
of choice at the country level. Even if one accepts the argument that 
manufacturing companies must invest abroad in order to survive (an unproven 
assertion), it does not follow that they must invest in a particular country 
or even in a particular region. In this regard, manufacturing companies 
differ sharply from extractive companies who are continually searching the 
world (soon to include the ocean bed) for commercially-exploitable minerals. 
The locational mobility of international manufacturers gives them 
a strong negotiating power with respect to individual governments seeking 
to attract foreign investment. 
This power would be somewhat weakened in the face of a common foreign 
investment policy supported by several governments, comprising a region, 
but the degree of weakening would also depend on the market opportunities 
offered by the region. Although the CACM countries can undoubtedly improve 
their bargaining position with foreign investors through a common policy, 
their position will remain generally weak because of the small size of even 
the entire CACM markets. 
It is a fact that most of the foreign investment in manufacturing 
has occurred in North America and Western Europe - not in the developing 
regions. With a few exceptions, markets in the developing countries are 
smaller and less dynamic than markets in the advanced countries while, at 
the same time, political risks have been much higher. Is it any wonder, 
then, that most international manufacturers have concentrated their investments 
in the industrial countries? Far from having to beat back an avalanche of 
foreign manufacturing investments, Latin America and other developing areas 
must find ways to encourage such investment or else foresake its potential 
economic contributions. 
/III. THE 
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III. THE INTERNATIONAL COMPANY AS AN EXPORTER OF 
MANUFACTURED PRODUCTS FROM LATIN AMERICA 
This final section examines the traditional role of the international 
manufacturing company in Latin Americai local market orientation induced 
by high import protection and high manufacturing costs. It then considers 
what Latin American governments can do to move international affiliate 
companies towards exports via economic integration, negotiations with 
international companies now in Latin America, and the application of screening 
criteria to new investment proposals. It closes with some brief remarks 
on the role of the international company as both a transfer and change agent. 
international Manufacturing Companies in Latin America: 
Local Market. Orientation 
Since the 1930s;, international manufacturers have established plants 
in latin America principally to maintain an export market that was 
threatened with extinction by import restrictions. 
Policies of import substitution adopted by Latin American governments 
have encouraged foreign investment in manufacturing facilities directed 
towards only the supply of the local market. Because of the limited size 
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absence of supporting industries, and other well-known factors, the 
production cost of these facilities is higher (and often much higher) 
than similar facilities at home or in other advanced countries. Investment 
in those facilities is profitable only because international competition 
is excluded by tariffs and import quotas. Since local competition has been 
either absent or weak,import-substitution policies have tended to create, 
therefore, monopolistic or semi-monopolistic foreign-controlled companies 
(alongside similarly-created local enterprise) that are primarily oriented 
to narrow local markets. From the standpoint of international management 
such investments are defensive (the maintenance of export sales) rather 
than aggressive (the development of market positions). 
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In contrast to this defensive strategy in Latin America, international 
companies have pursued an aggressive strategy with respect to their 
investments in Western Europe and North America. American companies have 
set up plants in Europe mainly in response to dynamic markets and competition, 
and only partly, or not at all, in response to protectionist tariffs and 
other import barriers. Increasingly, European companies are investing 
in North America for the same reason. Sharp reductions in tariffs at 
successive GATT conferences, and a general abandonment of import quotas 
for manufactures goods in both Western Europe and United States have 
continually reduced the importance of defensive strategy induced by import 
protection. 
As a consequence, American plants in Europe (and European plants in 
North America) are forced to compete not only with local plants but also 
with imported manufactured products. From the start, therefore, it is 
necessary that the costs of these plants be internationally competitive. 
This is why American plants in Europe have adapted quickly to the 
evolution of the EEC and EFTA and why many are. now exporting'to the rest 
of the world, including North America. Even in the middle 1950s,. 
United States companies in the United Kingdom were responsible for about' 
one-third of all United Kingdom exports of newer industrial products and 
for two-fifths if automobiles are included in this export, category.— The 
experience of American plants in Europe conclusively demostrates that 
international companies can make an important contribution to the export 
of manufactures, especially in new, technology-intensive products. But 
for this to happen manufacturing costs must be low enough to meet 
international competition. 
Manufacturing Costs in Latin America 
Ten years ago a comparison was made between the domestic costs of 
United States international companies and the manufacturing costs of their 
own subsidiary companies in Western Europe and Latin America. For Western 
Europe it was found that some plant costs were higher and some were lower, 
2/ See John H. Dunning, American Investment in British Manufacturing 
Industry (London, George Allen and Unwin) p. 293« 
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but on the whole plant costs were competitive with those in the United States. 
In the case of Latin America, however manufacturing costs in 69 per cent of 
the comparisons (the sample comprised 66 different products) were higher 
than in the Uhited States.^ The relevant table is shown below. 
Unit Cost Comparisons of Subsidiary Plants in Latin America and Plants 
in the United States of the Same International Companies 
(Percentages of sample) 
i&terial 
Plant Costs 
Total Sales Other • 
Total 
Unit 
Cost Labour Overhead 
Mexico - 13 73 53 28 56 56 31 
* 86 27 47 72 hh 44 69 
latin America - 7 57 7 7 27 18 14 
Excluding Mexico, 
Brazil and 
Argentina 4- 93 43 93 93 72 82 85 
Total 14 68 35 26 56 30 31 
Latin America 4- 86 32 . 65 75 44 71 69 
+ indicates costs equal to or higher than United States costs. 
- Indicates costs lower than United States costs. 
Looking at the entries for all Latin America it is noteworthy that 
material costs are usually higher than in the United States. Although 
unit labour costs are lower in Latin America in about 68 per cent of the 
comparisons, they are higher in the other comparisons despite much lower 
wage rates. It is not surprising that plant overhead in about two-thirds 
of the comparisons is higher in Latin America reflecting the generally 
smaller scale of outputs, frequently coupled with excess capacity. But 
observe that overhead costs in Mexico are lower in 53 per cent of the 
8/ T.R.Gates and F. Linden, Costs and Competition (New York: The 
Conference Board, 1961). 
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comparisons because its large domestic market makes possible economies of 
scale. (The bearing of the size of the local market on unit overhead 
costs is clearly indicated by the fact that Argentina, Brazil and Mexico 
all have much lower unit overhead costs than the rest of Latin America 
which in 93 per cent of the comparisons had higher unit overhead costs 
than the United States») 
In addition to production and selling costs, business income taxes 
and interest rates also may influence the prices of manufactured products 
in Latin America.^ Although the effect of business taxes on prices may 
be greater in the United States (certainly tax rates are higher), this 
effect is probably offset by higher interest rates in Latin America, 
particularly for working capital financing. 
High production costs constitute the single greatest obstacle facing 
latin American companies in their efforts to expand exports of manufactured 
products. This is true for both foreign-owned and national manufacturing 
companies. The countries best situated with respect to manufacturing costs 
are the big countries: Brazil, Mexico and Argentina. By producing for the 
sizeable internal markets in these countries some plants can achieve 
economies of scale that match those in North America and Europe. They are, 
therefore, much better prepared to enter international markets than plants 
in the smaller countries in Latin America. Competitive manufacturing costs, 
of course, are not the only factor in a company's export sales, but they 
do form an indispensable basis for any continuing export programme. Unless 
manufacturing costs can be lowered, the outlook for any broad expansion of 
manufactured exports by the smaller countries in Latin America can only be 
regarded as bleak. The foregoing table indicates that these countries . 
showed higher total unit costs in 85 per cent of the comparisons. They are 
caught in a vicious circle: exports of manufactures are constrained because 
production costs are high and costs, are high because the local market is 
small which, in turn, makes production costs high«.. 
Under conditions of perfect competition, of course, business income 
taxes have no influence on prices. But competition in manufactures is 
hardly perfect either in North America or Latin America, although 
perhaps for different reasons. 
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Clearly the smaller countries must find ways to break out of this 
vicious circle. One way is to introduce more competition into local 
markets by abandoning massive import-substitution policies for policies of 
selective import protection. Another way is through the encouragement of 
export-oriented production by both domestic and foreign companies. However, 
the most promising way lies through a regional integration of national 
markets. Wot only would integration directly broaden markets and thereby 
permit economies of scale, it would also intensify local competition and 
provide the basic conditions necessary for an expansion of exports by both 
domestic and foreign companies. 
In view of the slow pace of integration in Latin America, however, 
one can reasonably expect that most of the future growth of manufactured 
exports will occur mainly in Brazil, Mexico and Argentina. 
Regional Integration and the International Company 
Regional integration would allow international companies to rationalize 
their operations in Latin America, The present pattern of largely self-
sufficient local affiliate plants would be replaced by a pattern of 
interdependent plants that would take advantage of specialization and 
economies of scale. Some of these plants would produce finished products 
for sale throughout the integrated region; others would specialize in the 
production of inputs for other plants. One consequence of this rationalization 
would be a pronounced increase in intra-regional grade in manufactured 
goods; another consequence would be a drastic reduction in manufacturing 
costs of international affiliates mainly (but not entirely) because of 
economies of specialization and scale. 
Ihere is no need to speculate about such a response by international 
companies to integration in Latin America because there is the example of 
United States companies in the EEC. From the beginning, these companies 
have regarded the EEC as one market and they have created EEC-wide production 
and marketing systems to service it. Earlier this paper discussed the 
movement of international companies towards multilateral marketing strategies 
on a global scale. Regional integration in Latin America would enlarge to 
a remarkable degree the opportunity for multilateral marketing strategy in 
that region, and international companies would be the first to take 
advantage of that opportunity. 
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There is a fear in some Latin American circles that international 
companies would enjoy most of the fruits of economic integration, to the 
disadvantage of national companies. The economic and political issues 
raised by this anxiety are too complex to be adequately discussed here. 
As we have noted, international companies are highly motivated to.operate 
on regional or even global levels. Because this regional outlook is not 
shared by national companies (whose outlook is limited to the local market), 
it is to be expected that international companies will responde more quickly 
to regional market opportunities. But this does not mean that national 
companies will never respond, only that it will probably take some time. 
Again the example of the EEC! is instructive. In the first half of the 1960S 
it was the United States international companies who took fullest advantage 
of the common market, but as the decade progressed, more and more European 
firms began to market, and even produce, their products on an EEC scale. 
It can be argued that the "demonstration effect" and competition of 
United States companies have stimulated European companies to participate 
actively in the common market. 
If progress towards the creation of a common market in Latin America 
is measured t¡y the growth of intra-regiona.1 trade and specialization (a 
yardstick commonly used for this purpose), then international companies will 
almost certainly contribute strongly to that end if given the opportunity. 
But that is not the whole story. Integration would also strengthen the. 
capability of international affiliates in Latin America to export 
manufactures to North America and Western Europe by lowering production 
and marketing costs to competitive levels. Increasingly, these affiliates 
would be drawn into global multilateral marketing systems directed by the 
present companies. As indicated earlier, this has already happened to 
United States affiliate plants in Western Europe. 
In sum, Latin American governments should understand that any policies 
designed to limit the participation of international companies in regional 
common markets will also limit the creation by these companies of 
manufacturing bases for export to the industrial markets outside the region. 
This is especially true for those countries that have only small internal 
/markets. The 
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markets . The development of e x t r a - r e g i o n a l exports o f manufactures from 
those c o u n t r i e s i s i n e x t r i c a b l y l i n k e d t o the development o f i n t r a - r e g i o n a l 
t r a d e i n the same products . This i s t r u e f o r both i n t e r n a t i o n a l and n a t i o n a l 
companies. 
Moving I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f i l i a t e Companies Towards Exports 
I t was argued t h a t reg iona l i n t e g r a t i o n (with a l l i t s i m p l i c a t i o n s ) 
would be a powerful f o r c e moving i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f i l i a t e s i n L a t i n America 
towards an export o r i e n t a t i o n j a t f i r s t i n t r a - r e g i o n a l l y but subsequently 
e x t r a - r e g i o n a l l y as w e l l . But apart from i n t e g r a t i o n , indiv idual governments 
can t a k e c e r t a i n s t e p s t o s t imula te a f f i l i a t e e x p o r t s , with varying degrees 
of success depending on t h e c i rcumstances . Many o f these s t e p s , o f c o u r s e , 
w i l l belong t o a broader c l a s s o f e f f o r t s d i r e c t e d a t a l l manufacturers , 
whether n a t i o n a l or i n t e r n a t i o n a l . Genera l ly , i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f i l i a t e 
companies w i l l be more responsive t o o f f i c i a l export promotion p o l i c i e s 
than n a t i o n a l companies f o r a t l e a s t t h r e e r e a s o n s , 
F i r s t and foremost i s t h e f a c t t h a t a f f i l i a t e company belongs t o an 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l e n t e r p r i s e t h a t has t h e exper ience and organiza t ion to 
p e n e t r a t e export markets . Once a parent company decides t o use i t s 
s u b s i d i a r y i n l a t i n America as a source o f inputs or f i n i s h e d products , the 
export marketing problem i s l a r g e l y taken care o f by t h e e n t r y o f the 
s u b s i d i a r y i n t o an e n t e r p r i s e marketing system. Even when a s u b s i d i a r y 
i s al lowed t o seek export markets on i t s own (which may be the case e s p e c i a l l y 
f o r i t s export s a l e s wi th in L a t i n America), i t can c a l l on the parent company 
f o r marketing a s s i s t a n c e and a d v i c e . 
Second, the a f f i l i a t e company manufactures newer and more t e c h n o l o g i c a l l y 
advanced products than most n a t i o n a l companies. Indeed, t h i s i s the major 
compet i t ive advantage o f f o r e i g n e n t e r p r i s e i n L a t i n America. This product 
c a p a b i l i t y (which d e r i v e s from a c c e s s t o the technology o f t h e parent 
company) g ives the f o r e i g n a f f i l i a t e a comparative export advantage as w e l l . 
Third , the a f f i l i a t e company has more competent and aggress ive 
management (and t h e r e f o r e lower manufacturing cos t®) than most l o c a l companies. 
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One of the principal contribution of the parent company to its affiliate is 
"managerial technology" which is commonly transferred to nationals through 
executive development programmes.^' 
In view of these advantages one should expect to find that international 
manufacturing subsidiaries in latin America are already more export-oriented 
than their local counterparts. Unfortunately, there is little data on this 
question, but Fajnzylber 's study does indicate that this is the situation 
in Brazil.^' He found that one out of four affiliates of international 
companies export and they account for one third of.Brazil's exports of 
manufactured products. The technological content of these exports is 
significantly higher than the content of exports by national companies» 
Fajnzylber also indicated that for the great majority of firms vfao export 
manufactures, the activity is marginal and cyclical, but that this is less 
true of international affiliates than of national firms. 
Although international affiliate manufacturers as a group are probably 
exporting a higher fraction of their output than national manufacturers in 
Latin America, this fraction remains very low for most of them. As discussed 
above, these affiliates were mostly established to supply local markets 
when exports to those markets were excluded by high import protection. How 
can national governments now turn these international affiliates towards 
exports markets? 
Aside from the adoption of general policies favourable to the export of 
manufactures (realistic exchange rates, non-inflationary fiscal and monetary 
policies, etc.) and. export promotion programmes designed .to assist 
manufacturers in general, it is recommended that Latin American governments 
confer directly with international companies (first at the. affiliate and 
then if necessary, at the headquarters level) on the question of export 
10/ International companies aré making increasing efforts to staff 
management posts in affiliate with nationals. Partly this is a response 
to nationalism; partly to cost pressures, and partis'-, to the demands 
of corporate executive development programmes. 
11/ "Resumen de los principales resultados y conclusiones proporcionados 
por el informe: Estudio de algunos aspectos básicos para la formulación 
de una estrategia de exportación de productos manufacturados en 
Brasil", September 1969. 
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expansion. Government o f f i c i a l s should prepare f o r such meetings by-
gather ing data on each a f f i l i a t e ' s past export performance ( s i z e r a t e o f 
growthj d e s t i n a t i o n , product mix, share o f t o t a l product ion, e t c . ) and how 
i t compares with o ther companies i n t h e same i n d u s t r y . 
The purpose o f t h e s e conferences would be t o explore t h e ways by 
which an a f f i l i a t e can f u r t h e r i n c r e a s e (or i n i t i a t e ) export s a l e s . Fac tors 
t h a t l i m i t such s a l e s should be i d e n t i f i e d although t h i s i s not always a 
simple t a s k . I t i s p a r t i c u l a r l y important t o a s c e r t a i n which r e s t r a i n i n g 
f a c t o r s are t r a c e a b l e t o t h e operat ions o f the a f f i l i a t e (such as high 
manufacturing c o s t s ) and which are t r a c e a b l e t o headquarters p o l i c i e s 
(buch as export market l i m i t a t i o n s ) . 
With regard t o the f i r s t c l a s s o f r e s t r a i n t s , t h e government may be 
ab le t o o f f e r cons iderab le a s s i s t a n c e , e s p e c i a l l y when o f f i c i a l p o l i c i e s and 
r e g u l a t i o n s themselves c o n t r i b u t e t o o p e r a t i o n a l problems. To i l l u s t r a t e , 
a common complaint o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l managers i s t h a t hos t governments 
f r e q u e n t l y impose r e s t r i c t i o n s on imports o f raw m a t e r i a l s and o ther 
inputs t h a t then cause production stoppages and higher c o s t s . 
Export r e s t r a i n t s t h a t r e s u l t from headquarters p o l i c y towards an 
a f f i l i a t e a re a proper s u b j e c t f o r n e g o t i a t i o n s between t h e host government 
and headquarters management, In these n e g o t i a t i o n s publ ic o f f i c i a l s should 
impress on headquarters management t h e key importance t o t h e h o s t government 
o f h igher a f f i l i a t e e x p o r t s , po int ing out how headquarters p o l i c i e s now 
c o n s t r a i n them. The outcome o f t h e s e n e g o t i a t i o n s w i l l depend on t h e 
circumstances o f each c a s e , inc luding t h e r e l a t i v e bargaining power o f t h e 
two p a r t i e s . However, headquarters management w i l l be i n a weaker 
bargaining p o s i t i o n than otherwise i f i t cannot j u s t i f y i t s p o l i c i e s towards 
a f f i l i a t e management i n terms o f f a c t o r s beyond i t s c o n t r o l . When t h e 
f a c t o r s a re under i t s c o n t r o l (such as a d m i n i s t r a t i v e market l i m i t a t i o n s 
o r an export p r i c i n g formula imposed on the a f f i l i a t e ) , then headquarters 
w i l l have a f l e x i b i l i t y f o r making concess ions t o the host government. 
The f a c t t h a t t h e a f f i l i a t e i s a l ready operat ing i n t h e host country a l s o 
adds t o t h e bargaining power o f governments o f f i c i a l s . 
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Although direct talks with both affiliate and headquarters management 
will have mixed results, they are well worth the effort in the opinion of 
this writer. Si the longer run, however, the host government will achieve 
greater export results through a screening of new investment proposals by 
international companies. 
Screening new foreign investment proposals for their export potential 
Unless a government adopts a laissez-faire policy towards investments 
by international companies, it is compelled to decide on the merits of each 
investment proposal. To be rational this decision process should utilize 
screening criteria that reflect the interest priorities of the host , 
government. Mien these criteria are not explicitly defined and ordered 
in degrees of importance, then the government runs the risk of letting in 
investments that do not promote its interests or keeping out investments 
that do. 
The variety of interests that a government may have in foreign 
investments frequently makes it difficult to achieve a consistent set of 
screening criteria, as much for political reasons as for economic. Since 
the Second World War Latin American governments have placed major emphasis 
on the import-substitution effects of a proposed foreign investment in 
manufacturing facilities while other criteria - balance of payments effects, 
employment effects, and economic development effects - have been rarely 
decisive. In more recent years, ownership effects and technology effects 
have gained in importance. Only now, however, is attention turning towards 
the export effects of foreign investments in manufacturing. 
Latin American governments should now decide on the importance of 
export effects relative to other effects; they should determine the 
acceptable "trade-offs" among the different effects because no single 
investment can maximize all of them. Furthermore, host governments should 
let international companies know their investment preferences so that these 
companies can design proposals that are optimal. in terms of those preferences 
while soil! protecting their own interests. When international companies are 
unclear as to the preference structure of a host government, they may expend 
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considerable time and m o n e y in the development of proposals that are later 
rejected or substantially modified in painful negotiations, or they may 
simply avoid investment in that country. 
Even if it were politically feasible to make export effects the only 
criteria for the acceptability of foreign investment proposals, such a 
course of action would be unwise for Latin American governments. The reason 
is simpler an exclusive export criterion would screen out most investment 
proposals by international companies, many of which might be desirable 
because of other effects, Latin American countries can hope to attract 
very few purely I],export base" projects that are entirely directed towards 
the export of advanced manufactures to external markets.^—^ 
A quick review of the requirements for export-base projects will 
indicate why this is so. 
Export-base foreign investments may be classified in two main 
categories: (1) affiliate manufacturing facilities in Country A to supply 
finished products to markets in Countries B, C, D, ... and (2) affiliate 
manufacturing facilities in Country A to supply parts, components, 
sub-asseinblies, and other inputs to sister affiliates in Countries B, C, D ... 
The first category demands that Country A have advantageous access 
to the other countries via low or zero trade barriers (membership in a 
free trade area or customs union is the clearest example) and/or via low 
transportation costs (including ease of communications), and that these 
advantages be not offset by high manufacturing costs. For the most part, 
Latin American countries do not offer these advantages (with the exception 
of Mexico and some Caribbean countries), and, furthermore, manufacturing 
costs are often high. This situation would change, of course, if countries 
in Latin America abolished restrictions on intra-regional trade. Then 
export-base investments might be drawn to thore countries that offer 
favourable conditions for access to other countries in the region, as is 
frequently the case for the Netherlands and Belgium in the EEC. Preferential 
12/ We exclude from "advanced manufactures" the processing of raw 
materials. 
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t a r i f f t reatment by t h e i n d u s t r i a l c o u n t r i e s o f manufactures goods from the 
developing c o u n t r i e s would a l s o favour t h i s kind o f exper t -base investment 
i n L a t i n America, but probably only f o r a few c o u n t r i e s . 
The second category o f expor t -base f o r e i g n investment p laces high 
emphasis on low manufacturing c o s t and p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y i n Country A. 
The products i n quest ion o r d i n a r i l y have a high u n i t value eo t h a t 
t r a n s p o r t a t i o n c o s t s play only a minimal r o l e . The developing c o u n t r i e s 
t h a t have been most s u c c e s s f u l i n a t t r a c t i n g t h i s investment a re Taiwan, 
South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, Mexico, and some Caribbean c o u n t r i e s . 
These c o u n t r i e s o f f e r low-wage labour t h a t can be quick ly t r a i n e d t o a 
s e m i - s k i l l e d l e v e l ( o f t e n t h e labour i s f emale ) plus a s t a b l e p o l i t i c a l 
environment. A common example o f t h i s ca tegory o f export -base investment 
i s the sourcing by United S t a t e s companies o f e l e c t r o n i c sub-assemblies 
i n a f f i l i a t e p l a n t s i n ( s a y ) Taiwan f o r t h e manufacture o f f i n a l products 
i n United S t a t e s p l a n t s . Because t h e parent company has l o c a t i o n a l 
mobi l i ty with r e s p e c t t o t h i s type o f investment , i t can make comparisons 
o f manufacturing c o s t on a g l o b a l r a t h e r than on a merely r e g i o n a l l e v e l . 
Costs i n a L a t i n American country a r e compared a g a i n s t c o s t s i n an Asian 
country and ( p o s s i b l y ) a Southern European country. Cos t s , t h e r e f o r e , 
must be a t minimal l e v e l s t o a t t r a c t t h i s kind o f investments . P o l i t i c a l 
s t a b i l i t y i s a l s o key f a c t o r because any d i s r u p t i o n o f the a f f i l i a t e ' s 
production would f o r c e p a i n f u l adjustments on o ther company a f f i l i a t e s who 
depend on t h a t production t o support t h e i r own. On both counts - l o w 
manufacturing c o s t s and high p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y - most countr ies i n 
Lat in America cannot compete f o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l sourcing investments in 
manufacturing. 
The p r i n c i p a l motivat ion o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l manufacturing companies 
t o invest in Lat in America w i l l cont inue t o b e , t h e r e f o r e , t h e penet ra t ion 
and development o f markets i n t h e r e g i o n . To ga in a c c e s s t o r e g i o n a l markets , 
some i n t e r n a t i o n a l companies should be w i l l i n g t o commit part o f an 
a f f i l i a t e ' s production f o r export t o e x t r a - r e g i o n a l markets . (As previous ly 
observed, t h e r e should be no d i f f i c u l t y i n ga ining export commitments f o r 
r e g i o n a l markets t h a t are opened up by government agreements. ) 
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I t i s a ques t ion o f n e g o t i a t i o n s : What do both p a r t i e s g ive up with 
an export commitment? A broad opportunity f o r t r a d e - o f f s among d i f f e r e n t 
investment e f f e c t s enhances t h e p r o b a b i l i t y o f an eventual agreement 
between the i n t e r n a t i o n a l company and t h e hos t government. I s the 
government w i l l i n g to g ive up i t s i n s i s t e n c e on ( s a y ) a minor i ty j o i n t 
venture f o r an export commitment ? I s t h e company w i l l i n g t o e n t e r an 
export commitment (and p o s s i b l y a lower r e t u r n on i t s investment) i n 
exchange f o r t h e r i g h t to have a m a j o r i t y share o f a j o i n t venture or 
even f u l l ownership? For some investment proposals economic f a c t o r s w i l l 
undoubtedly r u l e out any export commitment by t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l company 
but f o r o thers t h e r e w i l l be some economic f l e x i b i l i t y t h a t w i l l a l low 
f r u i t f u l n e g o t i a t i o n s i f the host government i s a l s o w i l l i n g t o make 
concess ions or commitments. 
Some B r i e f Remarks on t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l Company as a Transfer and Change 
Agent 
I t i s f i t t i n g t o make some c l o s i n g remarks with regard t o the r o l e 
o f t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l company i n the world economy as both a t r a n s f e r and 
change a g e n t . 
The i n t e r n a t i o n a l company, e s p e c i a l l y a t the m u l t i n a t i o n a l s t a g e , 
has become a s p e c i a l i s t i n the t r a n s f e r o f products , technology, c a p i t a l 
and managerial e n t e r p r i s e among n a t i o n s . The t r a d i t i o n a l theory o f t r a d e 
assumed away any i n t e r n a t i o n a l m o b i l i t y o f f a c t o r s o f production; i n 
e f f e c t , t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l company has stood t h i s theory on i t s head. 
The d i s t i n g u i s h i n g f e a t u r e o f t h e advanced i n t e r n a t i o n a l company l i e s 
p r e c i s e l y i n i t s c a p a c i t y t o move f a c t o r s o f production from one n a t i o n 
t o t h e n e x t ; i t i s no longer confined t o t h e export and import o f products . 
This c a p a c i t y g r e a t l y enhances i t s a c t u a l and p o t e n t i a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o 
the i n t e r n a t i o n a l economy v i a a b e t t e r a l l o c a t i o n o f resources among nat ions 
and v i a growth and development e f f e c t s . 
The i n t e r n a t i o n a l company introduces a dynamic f o r c e i n t o t h e 
comparative c o s t s t r u c t u r e s o f nat ions by t r a n s f e r r i n g c a p i t a l , technology 
and management t o c o u n t r i e s and then combining them with l o c a l f a c t o r s 
t o produce new products i n new ways both f o r domestic consumption and 
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f o r e x p o r t . In t h i s way t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l company funct ions as a change 
agent , c r e a t i n g new pat te rns o f product ion, new technologies and new human 
s k i l l s i n host economies and s o c i e t i e s . 
A l l t h i s i s t o say t h a t the i n t e r n a t i o n a l company i s a potent 
economic engine f o r the t ransmiss ion o f productive f a c t o r s and technology 
among n a t i o n s . This economic r o l e i s underrated by economists and others 
whose a t t e n t i o n i s focused on the governmental l e v e l . I t s s i g n i f i c a n c e 
i s suggested by an QECD study t h a t found t h a t i n t e r n a t i o n a l companies are 
respons ib le f o r t h e t r a n s f e r o f more t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e t o t h e developing 
countr ies than o f f i c i a l t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e programmes. C a p i t a l 
t r a n s f e r r e d by i n t e r n a t i o n a l companies t o the developing countr ies a l s o 
compares favourably with o f f i c i a l c a p i t a l t r a n s f e r s . But t h e f e a t u r e 
t h a t d i s t i n g u i s h e s e n t e r p r i s e t r a n s f e r s from o f f i c i a l t r a n s f e r s i s not 
c a p i t a l or technology but management. I n t e r n a t i o n a l companies not only 
t r a n s f e r c a p i t a l and technology t o host countr ies (as do o f f i c i a l a id 
programmes) but a l s o combine them with l o c a l f a c t o r s o f production t o 
produce and market commercial products (something which o f f i c i a l aid 
programmes do not d o ) . 
Some development economists argue t h a t the i n t e r n a t i o n a l company 
does too much leav ing nothing f o r l o c a l e n t e r p r i s e . This i s s u e i s t o o 
complex t o go into h e r e . But t h i s argument does make quest ionable 
assumptions about the smal l backward l i n k a g e e f f e c t s o f f o r e i g n investments 
as wel l as t h e i r demoralizing e f f e c t s on l o c a l e n t e r p r i s e , e s p e c i a l l y i n the 
case o f manufacturing investments . 
Governments i n Lat in America cannot a f f o r d t o ignore t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
manufacturing companyj r a t h e r they should l e a r n t o d e a l with i t . 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l companies have the technology, managerial s k i l l s , organizat ion 
and market connexions t h a t Lat in America needs and which a r e a v a i l a b l e 
from no o t h e r s o u r c e . C e r t a i n l y no government or o f f i c i a l agency can do 
what IBM, and o ther m u l t i n a t i o n a l companies can do on a g l o b a l s c a l e . 
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.Governments i n L a t i n America (as w e l l a s governments e l s ewhe re ) 
s hou l d f i n d ways t o . e xp l o i t t he r e s o u r c e s o f the i n t e r n a t i o n a l company 
w h i l e , at the same p r o t e c t i n g the endu r i n g i n t e r e s t s o f t h e i r peop le s i n 
economic and s o c i a l advancement. I t i s no t s ugge s ted t h a t a n accomodat ion 
between the n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t and the i n t e r n a t i o n a l company w i l l be a n 
easy t a s k . But t h e p o t e n t i a l rewards j u s t i f y the. e f f o r t . 


